This is from "Tom Ricks' Inbox, at The Washington Post. Tom Ricks is the real deal.
Quoting from the article in the
Sunday, 19 October 2008 issue of The Washington Post:
Even before the U.S. military announced last week that it had killed the alleged No. 2 leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the group had been widely seen as on the ropes. Where did al-Qaeda in Iraq go wrong? In a paper prepared for the recent annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, the Australian political scientist Andrew Phillips argues persuasively that, by their nature, al-Qaeda affiliates tend to alienate their hosts. So in the "long war" against jihadism, time may ultimately be on our side--if we show patience, tolerance and a willingness to listen to local grievances.
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. . . [W]hen considered within the context of the broader history of the global jihadist movement, Al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq appears far from exceptional. . . . In successive conflicts ranging from Bosnia to Chechnya to Kashmir, the jihad jet-set has rapidly worn out its welcome among local host populations as a result of its idelogical inflexibility and high-handedness, as well as its readiness to resort to indiscriminate violence against locals at the first signs of challenge. Throughout their history, Al Qaeda's operatives have consistently sought to graft the global jihadist agenda onto localized conflicts involving Muslims. However, with the notable exceptions of Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban and to a certain extent the lawless tribal belt straddling the contemporary Afghanistan-Pakistan border, they have been generally unsuccessful in converting locals to the jihadist cause, much less securing a territorial base for the Caliphate. That this pattern has so frequently been repeated suggests that the underlying causes of Al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq may transcend the specific circumstances of that conflict . . . . Baldly stated, the causes of Al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq can be located in its ideological DNA.
[ But, Phillips adds, the U.S. decision to support armed Sunni tribesmen in Iraq may be undercutting the U.S.-backed government in Baghdad:] Al Qaeda may have lost Iraq, but this in no way implies that America and its allies have won.
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Regards -- Cliff
Regarding "Al Qaeda's operatives have consistently sought to graft the global jihadist agenda onto localized conflicts involving Muslims" I think that this is generally true. The 'Global Jihadists' leaders appear to be disaffected middle and upper class Arabs (eg. Egyptian and Saudi, some Palestinian) that may be equated to a modern-day equivalent of the Marxist-Leninist intellectuals of the late 19th to early 20th century, albeit with considerably more financial resources and associated firepower. Even the Afgani Taliban reached an understanding with the Jihadists in return for funding and weapons. The Islamic rhetoric both draws uneducated 'bomb fodder' and some popular support to their cause among the primarily poorly educated Moslem masses. It would be interesting to see an in-depth comparative analysis of the Jihadists and the Marxist-Lenninists. It may allow us to draw some conclusions - or options - for going forward on how to better meet this challenge.
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