Wikileaks Impacts on Intel

Clearly the problems for those in the Government from Wikileaks is going to be about access.  Over at The Washington Post is an article by Reporters Kimberly Dozier and Ann Gearan, "Brace for the post-WikiLeaks information big chill".  Yes, I know it was a 30 November item, but I am old and slow.  And, with the same dateline, CBS tells us that the Department of State has cut its computers off from sharing with other Government agencies.  I would read that as being especially the Department of Defense, but Intelligence Agencies also.

Here is a longish discussion of that problem from Night Watch.

At the national level, among national agencies, there is an overwhelming volume of information sharing on thousands of topics, but not necessarily on the right topics.  The sources are well protected.  An experienced professional can scan more than 2,000 reports per hour from 16 different agencies, if he has tweaked his message profile.

The tension is not between collectors and analysts, but between Security and the information flood.  How do an agency's security people protect more than 50,000 electronic messages per hour in computer profiles for - or from -- disgruntled employees with clearances, every hour of every day?

State Department's effort to be a team player after 9/11 by making most SECRET-classified State cables accessible to anyone with a SECRET clearance now appears to have been excessive.  It enabled the Wikileaks event this week.

In an earlier time, no PFC in the Army would ever have had such access to diplomatic traffic. Prior to 1986 the government had no personal computer work stations.  Then, a PFC got to read the paper reports that senior personnel gave him to read and evaluate.  He was accountable for them, usually had to sign a custodian's receipt and had a deadline for his evaluation.  That system was inflexible to the point of near uselessness, but it was secure.

The US intelligence confederation of agencies still has not found a formula for balancing security and access that is any better than "need to know."  9/11 showed that "need to know" is too restrictive for efficient counter terror cooperation.  The Wikileaks event showed that the "need to share" initiative is too broad to ensure security of critical information and systems.

This is a domain still waiting for a new good idea.

The outcome of the Wikileaks release of all those Department of State cables is like a reaction to a terrorist event.  We are taking actions that might have prevented the recent event, but are not thinking of the long term consequences.  And, we are not thinking creatively.  I expect there is a "Not again on my watch" attitude running through the Federal Government.  This is the real damage from the Wikileaks release.

Put another way, the cure is likely going to be worse than the disease.

Regards  —  Cliff