Pacific Security Cooperation

Here is some good news on the international front.  Some others are stepping up to take some responsibility for their own security.  This from Night Watch from last night:

Japan-Australia:  Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr and Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba on May 18 signed an intelligence-sharing agreement in Tokyo, Japan Today reported.  The two nations are strategic partners and need to increase the strength of their security relationship, Gemba said.


Comment: This agreement could not take place without the tacit encouragement of the US, which has intelligence sharing relations with both nations.  The larger implication is that the Asia-Pacific countries are taking back from the US responsibility for their own security affairs, as they should.  This is tonight's good news.


The next steps are to link up with South Korea and then persuade India to cooperate more forthrightly.  Then all the great and powerful democracies and the finest armed forces of Asia and the Pacific region will be linked.

I do think it will be a while before India joins this group.  Geography matters and they are down around the corner.  And, there are other complications.  This from an expert in the region:

One of the fundamental, underlying flaws with so many hopes and presumptions of Asian, not just NE Asian, multilateralism is the fundamental lack of defined borders as we have in Europe.  There simply has been no equivalent to the Helsinki agreement which set the current European borders as final.  Thus, no one argues any more about Alsace, Lorraine, Sudetenland, Silesia.

But in Asia, in many cases, they can't even agree on the NAMES, b/c each side is adamant about its claims. Is it Dok-do or Takeshima? Senkaku or Diaoyutai?  Scarborough Shoal, Panatag, or Huangyan?  Spratlys or Nansha or Bai Cat Vang, among others?  For that matter, is it the Sea of Japan or the East Sea; the South China Sea or the West Philippine Sea?

And for all that states sign onto ASEAN declarations or the Law of the Sea, few are prepared to actually submit to binding arbitration. Certainly not in the more prominent cases, especially those involving the PRC. Indeed, in a recent meeting with Chinese officials, they reiterated that matters of sovereignty are not subject to foreign, and especially American, pressure. But, to be fair, it's not as though anyone else is willing to risk losing their claims to various territories (and the waters and resources around them).

Of course, geography is but one factor.  Differing views of history (Japanese conduct in World War II being a prominent example), widely differing levels of development (to make the gap between Greece and Germany appear minuscule by comparison), different levels of political influence (Laos and Cambodia are seen as Chinese surrogates within ASEAN), all clearly affect the willingness of states to interoperate.  When I've asked Singaporeans about the Five Power Defence Arrangement (involving Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK), they speak of it fairly enthusiastically, pointing out that it's the only multilateral defense situation (NOT an agreement nor a treaty) in Asia.  When I've asked Malaysians about the FPDA, they frequently downplay it as a legacy of either the Cold War or the era of konfrontasi [Confrontation] with the Indonesians.  Most Americans don't think about it at all.

International relations is a messy thing.  That is why we sometimes get wars.  In retrospect the wars don't make any sense, but as they are entered they seem to be very important.

Regards  —  Cliff