Putin's War and Nuclear Weapons

For John, BLUF:  There is a conceptual distinction between strategic (intercontinental) nuclear weapons and tactical (or theater) nuclear weapons.  This distinction breaks down when they are being used on your nation.  In the case of Putin's War, for Russia the use may be tactical, but for Ukraine it is "strategic".  Nothing to see here; just move along.

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Would Russia Use a Tactical Nuclear Weapon in Ukraine?

From the Modern War Institute, US Military Academy, by Researcher Al Mauroni♠, 16 March 2022.

Here is the lede plus three:

Recent nuclear saber rattling by Russian President Vladimir Putin is forcing the West to confront a question that even many national security professionals have been able to ignore for decades:  Would Putin actually use tactical nuclear weapons?  More specifically, would he order a tactical nuclear strike on Ukrainian military forces out of frustration that his military forces have failed to achieve their objectives?  Assessing that possibility requires a reevaluation of certain assumptions that is long overdue. Russian Nuclear Weapons, in Context

In the current context, Putin could view nuclear weapons use as necessary to ensure Russian national security interests are not derailed by overt Western military support to Ukrainian efforts—which would be in line with stated Russian doctrine.  One course of action could be a so-called demonstration strike with a single low-yield nuclear detonation in Ukraine or over the Black Sea to serve as a dramatic warning that resistance to Russia’s military campaign must be ended, backed by the compellent threat of further tactical nuclear attacks.  There is no question that Putin has already signaled the use of nuclear weapons as an option, and he has stated his (alleged) concern about nuclear weapons being stationed in Ukraine for use against Russia.

Aside from the question of whether a Russian nuclear strike is credible as an aspect of future military operations in Ukraine, there are ample reasons that prudent policy must consider the threat of Russian nuclear weapons use as credible.  First, Russia does not have a “no first use” policy and has doctrine to use nuclear weapons in the event that it was losing a conventional conflict with NATO forces.  A nuclear attack against Ukraine would be intended to allow Russia to conclude a regional conflict on terms acceptable to its leadership.  Second, Russia under Putin has made significant investments in nuclear weapons modernization and has frequently exercised its nuclear forces.  Third, Putin has stated his concern over Ukraine developing a nuclear “dirty bomb” as well as the “aggressive statements” of NATO powers.  These false statements could be intended as establishing a casus belli to use a tactical nuclear weapon.  On the other hand, this might be merely a case of nuclear brinksmanship that will not play out in Russia’s favor.

At the article there are embedded links, if you care.

My view is that if President Putin uses one or two nuclear weapons for demonstration/coercion shots, there is no reason for us to respond in kind.  If he uses them it will be because he is losing.  If we ignore him, and the Ukrainians ignore him and he does not escalate, then the war is over.  I guess he could gas the whole nation, but he may not have enough chemical weapons to kill 40,000,000 people, or even 20,000,000..

Most of us can do little more than pray.

Regards  —  Cliff

♠  Al Mauroni is the director of the US Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies and author of the book, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the U.S. Government’s Policy.