City Life Reviewed, Monday, 13 May 2013

For John, BLUF:  More on yesterday's City Life show.  Nothing to see here; just move along.

On yesterday morning's City Life Show there were a number of issues touched on that need to be retouched before bedtime.  I mentioned the canard about Nixon and the IRS in this Blog Post, earlier today.

I was disappointed that Ms Marie Sweeney was so disparaging of New York Times Columnist Maureen Dowd, who Sunday wrote "When Myths Collide in the Capital" for the International Herald Tribune.  She seemed to see MoDo as just another Republican Operative.  As a Republican, while I very much enjoy Ms Dowd's writing, I definitely see here on the Democratic Party side of things, although being someone with a fair mind, she sometimes acknowledges when Democrats go off the rails.  I think this weekend's MoDo piece is worth reading.

Then there was reference to former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and his defense of the non-response on the part of the US to the attack on our facilities in Benghazi.  One headline read "Gates:  Benghazi-obsessed Republicans have ‘cartoonish’ view of military capability".

I wish to be clear here.  I do not believe we had military assets (or CIA assets) that could have intervened in the battle in time to make a difference.  At the same time, I believe there should have been a lot more "leaning forward in the foxhole" kinds of activities.  I was disappointed that forces were not moving, just in case this fire fight lasted longer than its eight to ten hours.

Here is a comment from a friend of mine, Janice, a retired Foreign Service Officer:

Secretary Gates has missed three big points.  First, as a former diplomat with no pin stripe suit I served in difficult places.  My son was evacuated three times.  We all believed that our government would (1) never negotiate our release if taken hostage and (2) our government would do all possible to help if we were seriously threatened.  As someone who had the privilege of working closely at times with our special military units, I do not have a "cartoon" impression of their capabilities or commitment.  I believe that some groups actually prepare to operate in a relative unknown environment.  I could be wrong.  Maybe things have changed.  Finally, can anyone tell me that we had no idea what the situation on the ground in Benghazi was?  I also have some faith in our intel capabilities.

Again, maybe am wrong.

Finally, we look weak, divided, and whiny.  Our enemies had better be sure that their actions have consequences.  Our friends ought to know the same.  Where was the Libyan Government support, for example?  If we are going to play in the big league, we have to at times demonstrate force and this was one of those times.  The world is not a kinder and more gentle place.

In at least one forum I read there was displeasure at the overcautious approach of our Government in this situation.

Recall then-Secretary Panetta's statement to reporters (as quoted in the New York Times of October 25, 2012):

The basic principle is that you don’t deploy forces into harm’s way without knowing what’s going on, without having some real-time information about what’s taking place.

Aren't we all glad our local police [and firemen] don't adhere too closely to that principle?

There are some lessons lost in the past.  After North Korea captured the USS PUEBLO (23 January 1968) or they shot down an EC-121 (15 April 1969) the US Air Forces in Europe instituted a program to respond in defense of our Reconnaissance forces in international waters or airspace in Europe.  Air Defense Aircraft were part of the response, as had always been the case for when Warsaw Treaty Organization helicopters harassed our own helicopters on the Inter-German Border (CREEK BALL).

To that was added an Air-to-Surface Capability (bombs and rockets), which we aircrews informally named "The Hook".  The long pole in the tent was aircrew planning and mission briefing.  Even on a weekend, the aircraft maintenance personnel would be able to "generate" the needed aircraft and the munitions personnel would be able to assemble the needed bombs and load them on available aircraft in a couple of hours.  But what about assembly of the aircrews?  In the years before cell phones, if an aircrew member left home for shopping in Trier (think going to Burlington) or lunch or dinner in Luxembourg (think going to Andover), he was out of touch until he came home. The solution to the "long pole" was to select aircrews currently on the base, sitting Victor Alert, to begin the planning effort.  In the mean time, personnel off duty would be recalled to suit up and assume the Alert role.  After a couple of hours (I don't remember the actual timelines) Bitburg Air Base would have four aircraft ready to launch out to attack surface targets in defense of Americans under attack.  Of course they weren't going very far without air refueling.  But, it was something.

Of course there was still the question of what they would pick for aim points.  But, just showing up might have been a factor in a situation of confusion.  One of the impacts of airpower is at the psychological level.

Regards  —  Cliff