Going to Syria?

For John, BLUF:  Right now we have more questions about Syria than answers.  Nothing to see here; just move along.

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From the Blog Small Wars Journal:

Only after a brutally honest assessment of certain critical issues should we even begin to discuss any form of overt intervention in Syria:

1. What is crucial to the US regarding Syria?
2. What if we did nothing?
3. What are the potential consequences of each posited response by the US?
4. What are the consequences of failing to achieve any of the above?
5. What lengths/limits are we willing to commit/accept to achieve our goals?

Lest these questions be dismissed as the thoughts of a weak minded liberal, the author is retired Army Colonel Keith Nightingale, with two tours in Vietnam with Airborne and Ranger (American and Vietnamese) units.  He commanded an airborne battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division.  He later commanded both the 1/75th Rangers and the 1st Ranger Training Brigade.  This is not his first piece for Small Wars Journal.

Other versions include this from the blog The Diplomat.  The orientation of this set of five from Mr Robert Farley is international communicating.

I’ve written many times in this space about the difficulty of sending clear messages in international relations; there are always concerns about how to read notes delivered by artillery and cruise missile. I recently finished Stuart Goldman’s book on the Nomonhan incident,♠ the decisive battle in the undeclared war between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1939. While the two incidents differ enormously in context and scope, there are some important parallels with regard to how states use military action to communicate.

Then Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist have a list of Eight Questions in the Blog Long Wars Journal.

What questions are our Congresscritters asking?

Regards  —  Cliff

♠  Short version here.  May have influenced the Japanese decision to attack the US in 1941.