Why We Were Slow to Field the MRAP

Here is the URL for a small booklet on one aspect of reforming Pentagon Procurement.

This all speaks to protecting our Service members from the impact of IEDs (Improved Explosive Devices).  For a time in Iraq the IED was the major focus of attend and the major cause of combat deaths and combat injuries.  One of the proposed solutions was more armor for vehicles our troops were using.  A lot of ink has flowed on this issue and the attached booklet adds to the ink slick.

Here is a quick introduction from the head of the Institute that sponsored the research for the booklet, Dr Patrick Cronin:

I attach our latest Occasional Paper, co-authored by INSS Senior Fellow Chris Lamb.  His incisive and empirical analysis of the difficulty of fielding mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles offer an excellent case study for thinking about the Pentagon's present approach to fielding irregular warfare capabilities.  The bottom line is that the problem cannot be reduced to acquisition reform; larger reforms are needed.  He and his co-authors end by quoting Secretary Gates: "In the end, the military capabilities we need cannot be separated from the cultural traits and reward structure of the institutions we have."

The problem is actually pretty complicated.  It is complicated because:

• The MRAP, in the end, may not be the right answer to the problem of counter-insurgency.  The reason is that to defeat the insurgents it may be necessary for the soldiers to get out and walk among the people being protected.  That is not to say that running down a Main Supply Route (MSR), the MRAP might not be the greatest thing since sliced bread.
• An organization as large as the Pentagon only works because there is a lot of delegation and a lot of committee work.  This sometimes leads to the dreaded "sub-optimization" argument, which has been around for at least 50 years.  This can be reduced to "my part works great and just because you are having problems with your part doesn't mean I need to redesign my part."

You may already have an opinion, in which case reading this may be superfluous.  On the other hand, this might be a short, insightful read.

I thought the interesting part was at page 34 of the booklet.

Regards  —  Cliff